Part 11 compliance fails at the foundations: audit trails that can be disabled, records stored in tables an administrator can edit, signatures that are really checkboxes, shared logins that break attributability. A vendor checkbox that says "Part 11" tells you a feature exists — not that the architecture can survive a data integrity inspection.
And the burden lands on you: it is your predicate rules, your validation, your 483. The vendor’s marketing page is not in the room when the investigator asks who changed this record and how you know.
Subpart B requires validated systems (11.10a), protected records retrievable through the retention period (11.10c), limited access (11.10d), and secure, computer-generated, time-stamped audit trails that do not obscure prior values (11.10e). Subpart C requires signatures unique to one individual (11.100), with two identification components and re-authentication in continuous sessions (11.200), cryptographically bound to their records (11.70).
Kintavo’s answer is architectural: records live on an append-only ledger the database itself refuses to alter, signatures require password re-authentication at the moment of signing, and the audit trail is the storage model — it cannot be turned off because it is not a feature.
A data integrity inspection opens with the classic request: show me every change to this QC record. The quality manager opens the record’s history — original entry, one correction with the prior value visible, the correcting operator, the reason, and the supervisor’s re-authenticated signature. The investigator asks how far back the trail goes. "To the first record in the system. It cannot be turned off." The line of questioning ends there.
Every row: who, what, when, before, after, and why. When an investigator asks how you know a record was not altered, the answer is that alteration produces a new entry — always, structurally, provably.